

WOODROW WILSON'S  
"PEACE WITHOUT VICTORY" ADDRESS  
JANUARY 22, 1917  
A CONTINUITY OF THOUGHT

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On January 22, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson delivered a speech to the Senate titled "Peace Without Victory" in which he claimed America had "no concern with the 'causes or objects' of the war."<sup>1</sup> He did not reiterate this theme in his address on April 2. Rather, he asked Congress to recognize the state of war with Germany, and urged the American people to give their "blood and treasure"<sup>2</sup> for democracy's sake. This dramatic shift from neutrality to belligerence has been presented as proof of Wilson's deceptiveness and his mastery of words. Former president Theodore Roosevelt charged that Wilson was part of a "nauseous hypocrisy."<sup>3</sup>

Yet, if one hears a few lines of the "Peace Without Victory" speech, one detects a strong resemblance to the Fourteen Points and other wartime speeches. This suggests that despite the metamorphosis of America's policies, there was a goal that remained constant. This end that drove Wilson tirelessly from one means to another was the hope for a liberal post-war order. Regardless of what Wilson's critics allege, there is a powerful degree of continu-

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ity in his wartime speeches. An analysis of his “Peace Without Victory” speech and its striking similarities to previous and following speeches proves this point.

Wilson yearned to dictate a just end to the destruction in Europe. Thus, it is no surprise to discover that “Peace Without Victory” was addressed to the world, and not specifically to the Senate. This speech would not only inform the Senate of the “thought and purpose”<sup>4</sup> of Wilson’s mind concerning the “foundations of peace among the nations.”<sup>5</sup> It would spread the gospel to the “people of the countries now at war,”<sup>6</sup> too. The delivery of the speech would fulfill an obligation, a duty to the “other nations of the world.”<sup>7</sup> America would reveal her aims for the coming peace frankly. In fact, Wilson had quietly telegraphed the same message to the American embassies in Europe before delivering it in Washington. Like a weapon of peace, “Peace Without Victory” was aimed at the peoples of France, England, Germany and America.

Wilson asserted in his speech that it would be “inconceivable”<sup>8</sup> for the United States to be left out at the peace table. When the “challenge”<sup>9</sup> of peace was placed before the world, America would accept. Wilson had no doubt that the belligerents would call upon “morally upright” America to mediate the peace settlement. This assumption was the backbone of his theory of neutrality, national policy between 1914 and 1917. Wilsonian neutrality meant that America could intervene militarily in Europe to keep the sides evenly matched. Then, the war would degenerate into one of steady attrition and stalemate. Finally, Wilson would end the bloodshed by dictating a lasting and pure peace.

In his August 19, 1914 message to the Senate, Wilson voiced his belief that America should stand “ready to play a part of impartial mediation and speak the counsels of peace.”<sup>10</sup> Yet, Wilson’s desire to remain impartial was molded by the coming events. In 1914, the British navy imposed a strict blockade against neutral shipping to the continent, specifically the Central powers. American vessels were seized, but England paid for lost cargo. Wilson raised a hue and cry, but took no actual counter-measures.

Instead, he wished to preserve a rough equality between the German land forces and the British naval powers so that neither could claim victory.

By 1915, America was linked economically to the Allies. When British shipping firms asked for loans, Wilson did not refuse, for he wished to maintain British superiority on the high seas. Therefore, when Germany pioneered the use of the submarine, the President objected. The introduction of the U-boat would tip the scales in favor of Germany, which would violate Wilsonian neutrality and betray his plans for a liberal world order. Hence, the United States shifted from a policy of isolation to one of non-belligerent intervention.

On December 18, 1916,<sup>11</sup> Wilson sent notes to the belligerents asking them for an explicit exposure of war aims. Germany refused to return a direct answer, and her evasion suggested looming imperialist motives. Even the Allies declared that they intended to extract a painfully large amount of reparations from the Central Powers and exterminate German power in Europe.

In December 1916, the German Foreign Office urged a peace conference of belligerents only, suggesting that any American attempt to intervene was unwanted. The German government left little scope for Wilson's idealism and believed that America was pro-British. Soon, Wilson was forced to choose between creating a liberal world order and changing American foreign policy to belligerence. He chose the latter so that he might still preside over the "great enterprise"<sup>12</sup> of peace-making.

On the surface, however, the German government and the Allies seemed amenable to peace negotiations during January 1917. The prospect of a new world order thrilled Wilson and he became charged with an electricity unknown to most men. His "Peace Without Victory" address reveals his optimism and hope. Yet in less than three months, the President's plan for peace had crumbled and the United States was preparing to enter the war on the Allied side. Wilson knew that war would exact a heavy human toll, but his war message was not marked with grim, cold realism. Instead, he believed the broad objective of the war was making the

world “safe for democracy.”<sup>13</sup> To him, the goal of this war remained one of restoring “peace and safety to all nations.”<sup>14</sup> The golden thread of idealism united Wilson’s peacetime and wartime speeches.

In his “Peace Without Victory” address, President Wilson declared that “the present war must first be ended.”<sup>15</sup> He made it clear that a greedy, vengeful treaty, one that would serve the “several interests and immediate aims of the nations engaged,”<sup>16</sup> would not guarantee future peace. In order to secure lasting peace, the people of America would have to be involved in forging the treaty. America would only accept a peace that was “consistent with [its] political faith and with [its] practical convictions.”<sup>17</sup> After making this statement, the President embarked on his interpretation of American peace objectives.

## I.

Wilson knew that a peace settlement that ignored the millions of people involved would fail. Therefore, the president included the “consent of the governed” concept in his “Peace Without Victory” address. He declared that a government derived its powers from its people, and could not justly “hand peoples from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property.”<sup>18</sup> He echoed this belief in his Four Supplementary Points to the Fourteen Points. Here, he stated that “people and provinces are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere chattels and pawns in a game.”<sup>19</sup> He asserted that previous peace conferences had failed because they were based on balance of power politics and not the will of the people.

On these grounds, Wilson supported the creation of a “united, independent and autonomous”<sup>20</sup> Poland in the “Peace Without Victory” address. Self-determination was such a vital concept to him that he devoted eight of his Fourteen Points to its enforcement. Two of these points—one to restore Belgian independence and the other asserting Russian self-determination—

were “indispensable.”<sup>21</sup> Other related points dealt with the fates of Czechoslovakia and a new Polish nation, the return of Alsace–Lorraine to France, and autonomy for the ethnic groups in Austria–Hungary. At the time, he suggested that the Austro–Hungarian Empire be federalized rather than carved up. Although Wilson did not understand the intricate machinations that led to the global war, he did perceive that the suppressed nationalism of the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Bosnians was intimately involved.

Wilson felt that self–determination was so important that he dedicated a Supplementary Point to the Fourteen Points to the concept. Here, President Wilson promised that “all well–defined national aspirations[s]”<sup>22</sup> would be taken into account when the peace was made. This idea travelled with Wilson to Paris. At the peace table, Wilson protested to the transfer of the Saar region and other German territory. The president urged Japan, which was replacing German imperialism in China with its own brand, to relinquish control of the Shantung islands. Wilson also supported the Italian acquisition of Trieste, an Italian state in the Austro–Hungarian Empire. Lastly he voiced his belief that Russia, struggling with revolution, should be let alone to deal with her own problems.

Near the end of his “Peace Without Victory” speech, Wilson identified another fundamental characteristic of an enduring peace. This point, related to self–determination, was the disavowal of imperialism. He proposed that each nation adopt the policy that it “should [not] seek to extend its polity over any other nation or people.”<sup>23</sup> Wilson alluded to the Monroe Doctrine, which declared that no European power should interfere in the matters of the Western Hemisphere.

Wilson’s desire to eradicate imperialism reflected his belief that the war was a “raking out of the pent–up jealousies and rivalries of the complicated politics of Europe.”<sup>24</sup> He had witnessed the European clashes over imperialistic claims like the Russo–Japanese War, the Moroccan and Fashoda crises, and the Boer War. He integrated his repudiation of imperialism in his

Fourteen Points by stating that a League of Nations would afford “mutual guarantees of political independence.”<sup>25</sup>

Wilson attempted to restrain imperialism at Versailles, but did not succeed entirely. The British were determined to annex the German colonies that they had conquered. Japan outlined claims in the Pacific and France demanded Togoland and Cameroons in Africa. Belgium and Italy hoped for German spoils as well. President Wilson declared, “in all frankness, the world would not accept such action,”<sup>26</sup> and he referred to the fifth of his Fourteen Points. Wilson and his advisors devised the system of colonial mandates to prevent acts of raw imperialism. These areas, including the coal-rich Saar region, were handed over to the League of Nations for supervision.

Wilson’s last point in his “Peace Without Victory” address followed as a sequel to his loathing of imperialism and support of self-determination. This advice, which would become the first of the Fourteen Points, urged nations to “avoid entangling alliances.”<sup>27</sup> The policy of frank politics remained consistent with a traditional American principle of non-intervention in European intrigue. In the eighteenth century, President Washington had urged the nation to keep away from fractious Europe and its continual rivalries. Wilson detested intrigue too, but he wished to avoid Washington’s isolationism.

The system of alliances had engendered the Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente prior to 1914. Wilson knew that the network of entangling ties helped to draw all of Europe into the quarrel between Austria and Serbia. He believed that past peace conferences, like the Congress of Vienna of 1815, failed on account of the devious diplomacy employed. The President’s views against secret alliances appeared as Point One of the Fourteen Points. Wilson advised “open covenants of peace, openly arrived at.”<sup>28</sup> He asserted that “private international understandings”<sup>29</sup> only served to complicate issues; thus, all future diplomacy should be overt, in “public view.”<sup>30</sup>

Wilson had difficulties converting foreign leaders to his religion of frank and open politics. In 1915, the Allies made the

secret treaty of London with Italy. If the Allies claimed victory, Italy would receive the Trentino, the south Tyrol, Istria and the city of Trieste, and some of the Dalmatian islands. In another secret covenant, the Allies partitioned the Ottoman Empire. Russia would annex Constantinople, the Bosphorus, the Sea of Marmara, Armenia, and the Dardanelles, while Britain would take Mesopotamia, and France would claim southeastern Asia minor. These treaties continued the ambitious imperialism of the ante-war years and ignored the “consent of the governed” theory. Wilson did not approve.

Japan also participated in secret treaties. She had invaded the Shantung Province of China in 1914. She confirmed her ownership of the region by obtaining secret approval from Britain, France and Russia. Then Japan presented China with the Twenty-One Demands, an ultimatum. Wilson abhorred the clandestine diplomacy, and supported China against Japan at the Paris peace talks.

## II.

President Wilson believed that all self-determined nations deserved equal places in a postwar global democracy. In his January 22, 1917 address, he emphasized the importance of an “equality between nations”<sup>31</sup> as a component of peace. The peace must not “imply a difference between big nations and small.”<sup>32</sup> Seven new independent states—Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia—were created by the Treaty of Versailles. Wilson insisted upon equality for these newborn countries in the League of Nations. In his words the League of Nations would afford “territorial integrity to great and small states alike.”<sup>33</sup>

The idea of “peace without victory” was related to Wilson’s concept of international democracy. In his January 22, 1917 address, he declared that victory would mean “peace forced upon the loser,”<sup>34</sup> and such a peace would act like “quicksand”<sup>35</sup> if the

slightest pressure was applied. Wilson advocated a “peace between equals,”<sup>36</sup> for only a peace of this type would last. This neutralist stand was adopted in this speech against the advice of Colonel Edward House and Secretary of State Robert Lansing. Lansing deemed this term “questionable if not criticizable.”<sup>37</sup> Walter Page, American ambassador in London, suggested that the phrase be altered to “peace without conquest.”<sup>38</sup> He felt that “peace without victory” would cause the Allies to take offense, since it would place them on the “same moral level”<sup>39</sup> with Germany. Despite criticism, Wilson refused to change the name of his speech.

On April 2, Wilson condemned the German Imperial government for “throw[ing] aside all considerations of humanity” and for “running amuck.”<sup>40</sup> Still, he hoped for a peace of reconciliation, a peace between equals. This was a keen insight into the psychology of nations. Wilson predicted that a peace accepted in “humiliation”<sup>41</sup> would be undermined in no time. Wilson was correct. Despite Wilson’s warning, the Treaty of Versailles was seen as a shame to Germany. The German Social Democrats shouldered the burden of this settlement, which German agitators, like Adolf Hitler, found easy to repudiate.

According to Wilson, the American representatives would be the only “disinterested people”<sup>42</sup> at the Paris Peace Talks. In July 1917, Wilson wrote to Edward House that “England and France have not the same views with regard to peace that we have.”<sup>43</sup> The French wanted a league of victors with a strong army, in which France would dominate. Clearly, premier George Clemenceau of France was bent on destroying German power and eliminating the possibility of a German attack. “I can never sign a treaty made on these lines,”<sup>44</sup> said Wilson to his wife. Throughout the conference, Wilson struggled to create a semblance of reconciliation. When France proposed dismembering Germany and plucking the rich Saar Valley for itself, Wilson “would not be a party to it.”<sup>45</sup> He protested as vehemently to monstrous reparation payments demanded of Germany by France and England.

Wilson was perceptive to see that a harsh “diktat” would not last. In his “Peace Without Victory” speech, Wilson said that he

was facing realities, and not “soft concealments.”<sup>46</sup> Nevertheless, self-serving, suspicious instincts won at Versailles and the resulting treaty was a settlement between victors and vanquished. As Wilson had prophesied, it was as permanent as writing upon water.

### III.

The heart of his new plan involved the creation of a “guarantor of the permanency of the settlement.”<sup>47</sup> This force would be “stronger than any probable combination of nations.”<sup>48</sup> It would exist in the form of a “community of power,”<sup>49</sup> replacing the *realpolitik* balance of power. Wilson had already given the belligerents a taste of this world parliament project. In January 1916,<sup>50</sup> Wilson’s advisor, Edward House, discussed plans for a postwar league in London, Paris, and Berlin. America had also heard of the plans; Wilson’s political platform in the presidential election of 1916 committed the Democratic party to support the United States’ participation in such an organization. Three months after his inauguration, he confirmed America’s willingness to abandon isolationism and participate in a league to enforce peace again in a speech at Washington.

President Wilson referred to the idea of a League of Nations in his war message, too. He asserted that “a universal dominion of right by...a concert of free peoples”<sup>51</sup> would prevent future international bloodshed. His mention of a peace-keeping force in the January 22, 1917 address foreshadowed the last and dearest point of his “Fourteen Points.” There, Wilson stated that the world needed a strong dose of cooperation to eliminate the cancer of war. In his words, a “general association of nations”<sup>52</sup> which would afford “mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity”<sup>53</sup> to all nations would save the peoples of the earth from further destruction.

At the Paris peace conference table, Wilson insisted on creating the League of Nations. The result of his efforts was Article X. The American President defended his beloved article as “the

heart of the enterprise.”<sup>54</sup> “If there had been a League of Nations in 1914...Germany would never have dared to attempt the aggression she did attempt.”<sup>55</sup> He felt that the fate of mankind was at stake, and that a refusal to ratify Article X would serve as a “death warrant.”<sup>56</sup> In order to convince the American people that their country belonged in the League, Wilson traveled eight thousand miles in twenty-two days and delivered forty addresses.<sup>57</sup> He paid for his supreme dedication to the League principle on October 2, 1919.<sup>58</sup> A clot occurred in a brain artery, and Wilson’s life was in peril. He survived the first attack, but it left him sapped of energy, a shadow of his former self. He truly believed that the League would serve as a “key to the whole [peace] settlement.”<sup>59</sup>

The League of Nations was designed to guarantee collective security by enforcing international guidelines. According to the “Peace Without Victory” address, “free access”<sup>60</sup> to the seas for all nations was one such rule. He stated the freedom of the seas was the “*sine qua non* of peace, equality and cooperation.”<sup>61</sup> Without free and common water routes, there could be no “trust or intimacy.”<sup>62</sup> President Wilson had always insisted upon freedom of the seas for neutrals and enforcement of international agreements on the behavior of belligerents. Even after the British passenger liner, the *Lusitania*, was sunk by German torpedoes, Wilson refused to inhibit American travel in belligerent war zones or foreign waters.

In his April 19, 1916<sup>63</sup> address to Congress, Wilson declared that “we owe it to due regard for our own rights as a nation, to our sense of duty as a representative of the rights of neutrals the world over, to take this stand”<sup>64</sup> on freedom of the seas. Wilson integrated the idea of free seas into the Fourteen Points. In his second point, he insisted upon “absolute freedom of navigation”<sup>65</sup> with the exception of cases of joint international actions. Predictably, Britain protested Point Two.

The League of Nations would also have required the nations of the world to reduce armaments. In “Peace Without Victory,” he asserted, “There can be no sense of safety and equality among the nations”<sup>66</sup> if armies, navies and other military programs

are widened. This idea became the fourth of the Fourteen points. Point Four stated that arms would be reduced to “lowest points consistent with domestic safety.”<sup>67</sup> However, by the Treaty of Versailles, Wilson’s plan for arms reduction was applied to Germany alone. Her army was limited to 100,000 men,<sup>68</sup> and she was not allowed to possess submarines, heavy artillery or aviation.


“These are American principles, American policies,”<sup>69</sup> concluded Wilson at the end of his “Peace Without Victory” address. Open politics, disavowal of imperialism, consent of the governed, international democracy, peace without victory, freedom of the seas, armaments reductions—these were the ideals Wilson held dear to his heart. They were the “principles of mankind,”<sup>70</sup> and Wilson would not desert them.

The “Peace Without Victory” speech was hailed in the liberal circles of the Allied nations and the United States as a “noble charter of the new international order.”<sup>71</sup> The *Public Ledger* of London stated that the “best opinion here is one of deep feeling and profound admiration”<sup>72</sup> for Wilson. The American President’s picture of a liberal world order, based on the principles of Christian love rather than *realpolitik*, was enticing. After this speech, many Americans and Europeans began to see Wilson as the new ‘moral leader’<sup>73</sup> of the world.

As a peace endeavor, however, the “Peace Without Victory” speech failed. On February 3,<sup>74</sup> the German Imperial government announced that it would resume submarine attacks on all American ships found in the broad war zones. German Chief of Admiralty Staff, Admiral Von Holtzendorff, guaranteed that the “U-boat will lead us to victory.”<sup>75</sup> Obviously, Germany preferred victory to peace. Although Wilson was indignant and extremely disappointed by Germany’s submarine policy, he was so committed to the “peace without victory” principle that he hesitated to sever relations with Germany.

Wilson remained true to his idealistic beliefs even during the war. He asserted in his war message, “We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion.”<sup>76</sup> In his four major addresses from January to December 1918, Wilson clarified and

redefined the major points made in this “Peace Without Victory” speech. He maintained that the United States was not motivated by greedy ends, but rather, it was interested in the “peace of the world.”<sup>77</sup> Wilson’s firm devotion to principle was a significant factor in the creation of the Treaty of Versailles. The “Peace Without Victory” speech was an exemplary distillation of Wilson’s ideas on international relationships and on America’s role as a peacemaker.



- <sup>1</sup> "Peace Without Victory," in Henry Steele Commager, ed., Documents of American History, 9th ed. (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1973) p. 125
- <sup>2</sup> Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson: A Brief Biography (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1963) p. 113
- <sup>3</sup> Patrick Develin, Too Proud to Fight (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975) p. 684
- <sup>4</sup> "Peace Without Victory," in Commager, ed., p. 125
- <sup>5</sup> Ibid., p. 125
- <sup>6</sup> Leon H. Canfield, The Presidency of Woodrow Wilson: Prelude to a World Crisis (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1966) p. 91
- <sup>7</sup> "Peace Without Victory," in Commager, ed., p. 125
- <sup>8</sup> Ibid., p. 125
- <sup>9</sup> Ibid., p. 125
- <sup>10</sup> Ibid., p. 125
- <sup>11</sup> Allen Johnson, ed., Woodrow Wilson and the World War (New York: US Publishers, 1921) p. 39
- <sup>12</sup> "Peace Without Victory," in Commager, ed., p. 125
- <sup>13</sup> "Wilson's Speech For Declaration of War Against Germany," in Albert Shaw, ed., President Wilson's State Papers and Addresses (New York: The Review of Review Company, 1918) p. 381
- <sup>14</sup> Ibid., p. 381
- <sup>15</sup> "Peace Without Victory," in Commager, ed., p. 125
- <sup>16</sup> Ibid., p. 126
- <sup>17</sup> Ibid., p. 126
- <sup>18</sup> Ibid., p. 126
- <sup>19</sup> "Four Supplementary Points to the Fourteen Points," in Link, Woodrow Wilson: A Brief Biography, p. 131
- <sup>20</sup> "Peace Without Victory," in Commager, ed., p. 126
- <sup>21</sup> Link, Woodrow Wilson: A Brief Biography, p. 128
- <sup>22</sup> Ibid., p. 128
- <sup>23</sup> "Peace Without Victory," in Commager, ed., p. 127
- <sup>24</sup> Johnson, ed., p. 40
- <sup>25</sup> "The Fourteen Points," In Commager, ed., p. 138
- <sup>26</sup> Canfield, p. 187
- <sup>27</sup> "Peace Without Victory," in Commager, ed., p. 127
- <sup>28</sup> "The Fourteen Points," in Commager, ed., p. 138
- <sup>29</sup> Ibid., p. 138
- <sup>30</sup> Ibid., p. 138
- <sup>31</sup> "Peace Without Victory," in Commager, ed., p. 126

- <sup>32</sup> Link, Woodrow Wilson: A Brief Biography, p. 99
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid., p. 113
- <sup>34</sup> "Peace Without Victory," in Commager, ed., p. 126
- <sup>35</sup> Ibid., p. 126
- <sup>36</sup> Devlin, p. 603
- <sup>37</sup> Ibid., p. 603
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid., p. 603
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid., p. 603
- <sup>40</sup> N. Gordon Levin, "War, Revolution and Wilsonian Diplomacy," in Howard S. Quint, et al., eds., Main Problems in American History, 4th ed. (Chicago: Dorsey Press, 1978) p. 205
- <sup>41</sup> "Peace Without Victory," in Commager, ed., p. 126
- <sup>42</sup> Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition (New York: Vintage Books, 1989) p. 352
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid., p. 603
- <sup>44</sup> Link, Woodrow Wilson: A Brief Biography, p. 151
- <sup>45</sup> Ibid., p. 603
- <sup>46</sup> "Peace Without Victory," in Commager, ed., p. 126
- <sup>47</sup> Ibid., p. 126
- <sup>48</sup> Ibid., p. 126
- <sup>49</sup> Ibid., p. 126
- <sup>50</sup> Link, Woodrow Wilson: A Brief Biography, p. 99
- <sup>51</sup> Ibid., p. 113
- <sup>52</sup> "The Fourteen Points," in Commager, ed., p. 139
- <sup>53</sup> Ibid., p. 139
- <sup>54</sup> Link, Woodrow Wilson: A Brief Biography, p. 164
- <sup>55</sup> Gene Smith, When the Cheering Stopped (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1964) p. 73
- <sup>56</sup> Ibid., p. 73
- <sup>57</sup> Link, Woodrow Wilson: A Brief History, p. 166
- <sup>58</sup> Smith, p. 112
- <sup>59</sup> Canfield, p. 169
- <sup>60</sup> "Peace Without Victory," in Commager, ed., p. 127
- <sup>61</sup> Ibid., p. 127
- <sup>62</sup> Ibid., p. 127
- <sup>63</sup> "Special Message to Congress on the 'Sussex Affair'," in Shaw, ed., p. 262
- <sup>64</sup> Ibid., p. 262
- <sup>65</sup> "Address to Congress Stating War Aims and Peace Terms of the United States," in Shaw, ed., p. 468
- <sup>66</sup> "Peace Without Victory," in Commager, ed., p. 127
- <sup>67</sup> "Address to Congress Stating War Aims and Peace Terms of the United States," in Shaw, ed., p. 468

<sup>68</sup> Robert R. Palmer and Joel Colton, A History of the Modern World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1984) p. 690

<sup>69</sup> "Peace Without Victory," in Commager, ed., p. 127

<sup>70</sup> Ibid., p. 127

<sup>71</sup> Johnson, ed., p. 105

<sup>72</sup> Ibid., p. 105

<sup>73</sup> Ibid., p. 106

<sup>74</sup> Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era (New York: Harper and Row, 1954) p. 266

<sup>75</sup> Ibid., p. 267

<sup>76</sup> "Wilson's Speech for Declaration of War Against Germany," in Commager, ed., p. 131

<sup>77</sup> Herbert Hoover, The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson (New York: McGraw Hill Book Company, 1958) p. 27