Refugee Hosting/Producing Countries: Zaire/DRC

The story of refugees and internal displacement within Zaire/Democratic Republic of Congo during the 1990s cannot be divorced from the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide and other regional developments. Displacements resulting from the genocide led to a chain of events which led to the overthrow of the president of Zaire and what has come to be referred to as Africa's first continental war. More than 2 million refugees fled Rwanda after the 1994 genocide, more than 1 million of whom ended up in Zaire. The camps that were created to protect the refugees also became places for Rwandan militants to hide, leading to such a dire security situation that several neighboring countries ended up intervening in the country on one side or another, a situation that much of Africa is still dealing with today, thus demonstrating the link between displacement and security.

In the months before the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, there were close to 1.2 million displaced persons in Zaire, including close to 500,000 refugees from neighboring countries and 700,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs). The largest contingent of refugees in Zaire came from Angola. Peaking in the late-1980s and early-1990s at around 300,000, the majority of Angolan refugees had lived there for a number of years, having fled the long-standing civil war in their home country. 90,000 of these refugees left Zaire in 1991 and early 1992 at the apparent end of the civil war. However, most of these returned in late-1992 as fighting erupted again in Angola. Another large group of refugees, numbering approximately 120,000, came from Sudan. As with the Angolan refugees, many of these Sudanese had also lived in Zaire for several years, also fleeing a long-running civil war in their country. There were also a significant number of Burundian refugees in Zaire. Heading into the 1990s, about 10,000 Burundians lived in Zaire. This increased dramatically in 1991 as civil conflict between Hutu and Tutsi flared, leading to a refugee population in Zaire of 45,000 by the beginning of 1992. Many of these returned home in 1992, only to flee again in late-1993 in the wake of massacres after a coup. 50,000 of the estimated 600,000 refugees who fled Burundi went to Zaire. Other refugee populations included about 50,000 Rwandese, many of whom had been in the North Kivu region of Eastern Zaire for decades, as well as about 20,000 Ugandan refugees in northern and eastern Zaire.

The number of refugees in Zaire was eclipsed by Zaireans internally displaced as a result of political upheaval in 1992 and 1993. Zaire had been ruled by Mobutu Sese Seko for about three decades since soon after independence in 1960. In 1992 a political crisis erupted between Mobutu and opposition politicians who attempted to break his hold on power. In January, Mobutu suspended the National Conference which was trying to institute political reforms. In February, government forces fired on protesters and looted and destroyed houses of opposition supporters in eastern Kivu. As result, 17,000 Zaireans fled to Uganda, many of whom returned to Zaire later that year. Further political conflict ensued, and Mobutu's supporters fomented ethnic violence in Shaba Province, forcing hundreds to flee to Zambia and leaving 100,000 internally displaced. The situation declined dramatically in 1993, with two competing governments and monetary systems in place. The Mobutu government was able to stay in power partly because of its ability to create division among its opponents, partly through fomenting ethnic conflict among the country's 200 different ethnic groups. In particular, there was significant conflict among Katangans in the Shaba region (formerly known as Katanga) and people from Kasai who had lived in Shaba for generations. 500,000 Kasains fled their homes in Shaba in 1993, becoming internally displaced either in Shaba or Kasai. Ethnic conflict also flared in North Kivu where ethnic Banyrawanda, who also had lived in the region for a long time, were denied citizenship. Violence between various groups in the region forced 200,000 people to flee their homes. In addition to fomenting ethnic violence, the Mobutu government also destroyed camps for displaced persons. All of this conflict and displacement had led to a potential disaster as access to food and clean water decreased, and diseases such as cholera, malaria, and meningitis spread among the displaced.

The situation became much more dire and the numbers of displaced in Zaire essentially doubled in the aftermath of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The presence of 1 million Rwandan refugees also dramatically increased insecurity in Zaire and the entire region. In fact, nowhere can the link between forced displacement and security be demonstrated more clearly than in Zaire/DRC._The genocide began on April 6, 1994. During the 100 days of the genocide, approximately 800,000 Rwandese-Tutsi and Tutsi-supporting Hutu-were killed by Hutu militants. Most Tutsi were unable to leave the country. As soon as the genocide started, the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF)-comprised of Tutsi who had fled to Uganda during early conflict-moved into Rwanda, and many Hutu, who were afraid of retribution by the RPF or who were essentially pushed out of the country by Hutu militants, fled the country. In July, 1 million Hutu fled to Zaire, more than half of whom ended up in Goma in North Kivu, just across the border from Rwanda. There were more than 50,000 former Rwanda military and militia personnel hiding among the refugees in Goma and elsewhere in Zaire. They used the camps as cover for raids in Rwanda. In the months after the end of the genocide in July, they increased their hold over the camps. There was discussion about the necessity of separating out the militants from the rest of refugee population. However, the international community was not interested in providing the military and other resources necessary to enhance camp security. Rather, it preferred to respond to the humanitarian crisis in Goma which was grabbing headlines at the time, including a cholera epidemic that killed thousands of refugees. In the last part of 1994, the international community was spending $1 million per day on humanitarian relief for Rwandan refugees in Zaire.

Meanwhile, the aid community, and in particular the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), was left to its own devices to ensure security in the refugee camps it was running. Intimidation and assassinations of refugees who wanted to return to Rwanda were common, and relief workers received death threats, forcing them to temporarily withdraw from one camp near Goma. Some organizations left Zaire permanently. The Zairean military also harassed and looted refugees. After the UN Security Council rejected a proposal by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in January 2001 for an international peacekeeping force to police the camps and separate out the militants, UNHCR resorted to hiring 1,500 Zairean troops to create the Zairean Camps Security Contingent to police the camps. These troops were not, and could not be, under the command of UNHCR, and did little to ensure security. In fact the Zairean government, who the ZCSC ultimately reported to, funded the militants in the camps, thus undermining the expressed purpose of the ZCSC.

From August 1994 through the first part of 1995, it became increasingly clear that the camps were contributing to regional insecurity. However, with the intimidation of the militants of refugees within the camps, and unsafe conditions in Rwanda, it was difficult to figure out how to deal with the situation. Some supported forced repatriation, arguing that the only way to break the grip of the militants was to take the refugees out of their control and take away their hiding places in the camps. This was a direct violation of the principle of nonrefoulement, forbidding the forcible return of refugees to a country where they might be in danger, and UNHCR officially opposed this, although some UNHCR workers on the ground thought this was the only to deal with militant intimidation.

The first forced repatriation from Zaire occurred in August 1995, when the Zairean government sent 12-15,000 refugees back from the Kivu region, at least partly in response to perceived bias against Zaire by the international community. This forced return ended a few days later after international condemnation. Soon after, the government announced a deadline of December 31, 1995 for all refugees to leave Zaire. However, after a meeting with former US President Jimmy Carter in November, this deadline was suspended.

During the first part of 1996 the Zairean government restricted the travel of refugees as well as much economic activity within the camps, including closing shops, thus increasing hardship for the refugees in the camps and, it was hoped, encouraging the refugees to return to Rwanda. This strategy had little effect. There was also discussion of moving the camps further from the border, thus making it harder for the militants to carry out attacks in Rwanda. However, this was not supported by Zaire, and it was recognized that this might undermine attempts to encourage voluntary repatriation. Further, many of the refugees who were in camps very close to Rwanda were resistant to moving. They had interests in Rwanda, including property, and did not want to lose their easy access to those interests. Finally, without separating the militants, the situation would not improve. In the end, there was no action taken as a result of these discussions.

At the same time, the security situation in eastern Zaire was getting worse. Infiltration into Rwanda continued, and there were many clashes between the refugees and the local populations. Further, by October a widespread civil war had emerged in Eastern Zaire as a result of an attempt by the government to expel approximately 400,000 local Tutsi-the Banyamulenge, who had previously had citizenship rights taken away. The Banyamulenge, and other forces hostile to the Mobutu regime, constituted themselves as the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) and counterattacked. The ADFL, which was later to oust Mobutu from power, was also supported by Rwanda and Uganda, who were particularly concerned with ending the infiltrations from Zaire. As the ADFL swept through eastern Zaire, they attacked refugee camps, since they saw the former military personnel and militia as enemies and the camps as enemy bases. Thousands of refugees died, probably at the hands of all parties involved in the conflict-ADFL, former Rwandan military and militia, and Zairian troops. And, from late-1996 onwards, all of the major camps were emptied.

From November 15 through November 20, 1996, as a result of an ADFL offensive on Goma, approximately 600,000 refugees repatriated to Rwanda from the Goma area. At least 200,000 more refugees fled further into Zaire. In fact, it appears that it was not necessarily an ADFL goal to push the refugees back to Rwanda. Rather, the aim was to destroy the camps, thus depriving the Hutu militants bases from which to launch their infiltrations. There is speculation that the ADFL may actually have wanted to push the refugees further into Zaire, away from the border, making it harder for the militants to operate and, more generally, to prevent the return of an extremely large number of Hutus. In any event, another group, the Mai Mai, who wanted to get rid of all Kinyarwanda speakers from the Kivu region, prevented most of the refugees from fleeing into Zaire.

Some did, however, go further into Zaire, sometimes pushed by the Hutu militants who were, yet again, using them as human shields. However, as soon as the refugees poured back into Rwanda, the Rwandan government, supported by the United States, declared the refugee problem solved, saying that no refugees were left in Zaire. There was also a debate regarding how many refugees actually repatriated, prompting the so-called "numbers game," where Rwanda and the US declared all the refugees returned, and UNHCR, supported by intelligence from other countries, claimed that there were still many refugees unaccounted for. This in fact, became a major international controversy, which brought UNHCR into direct conflict with the biggest international player and the government of the refugees.

Although Rwanda had periodically called for the refugees to return home, there was still concern about the effect that such a massive repatriation would have on the country. Thus, the best strategy from Rwanda's perspective was to declare the refugee crisis over, and let the refugees, including many militants and their families, come to whatever fate they might in the Zairian forest. The US supported Rwanda's position, at least partly because of guilt arising from the US' standing on the sidelines as the genocide occurred. Further, there was significant donor fatigue by this time and less interest in continued support for large refugee populations. In addition, declaring the refugee crisis over undermined support for and eventually killed a proposed UN sponsored Multinational Force to deal with the security situation, thus relieving pressure for a mission that almost nobody wanted.

Regardless of the actual figures, the mystery refugees did start reappearing. An additional 85,000 repatriated from Zaire by the end of 1996. However, many of the refugees had gone north and west, some appearing as far away as the Republic of Congo, where approximately 15,000, many armed, settled in remote villages in the north of the country. About 10% of these were eventually repatriated by UNHCR. Further, approximately 12,000 refugees were repatriated by UNHCR by air from Mbandaka, near the Republic of Congo, between May and November 1997. Another 3,700 refugees were repatriated from the area of Mbujimaya, south and west of the Kivu region toward Angola. The vast majority of the refugees, however, appeared at Tingi-Tingi, where 160-170,000 refugees lined the road by the end of February 1997. This region, which was north and west of Goma, approximately halfway to the Central African Republic, was very remote and hard to get to. There was no government authority in the region, which led to a power vacuum and a lack of law and order. Further, there were arms in the camp and UNHCR personnel had little protection. The refugees fled north and west on February 28 toward Ubundu and Kisangani (where they were not let in) as a result of the advance of the ADFL. The camp was overrun on March 1, and all aid personnel were expelled. UNHCR was prevented from gaining access to the refugees in the Kisangani area. It was declared an Operational Zone by the ADFL, and many refugees were killed. UNHCR was able to reestablish its presence in Kisangani by the beginning of April, although it was far from an ideal situation. UNHCR was given 60 days to repatriate all the refugees. Troops followed UNHCR personnel as they sought out and visited refugees. They were very rough and many refugees were killed. The situation was also bad in other ways. The mortality rate in Kisangani was an astounding 62 per 10,000. By way of comparison, the normal mortality rate in refugee camps is .06 per 10,000. A rate of 2 per 10,000 constitutes an emergency, and 4 per 10,000 is declared an emergency out of control. Most of the refugees were begging to go back. It was obvious that they would die if left in the forest, although it was unclear whether the prefectures from which the refugees came were safe. Yet, the situation was very dire and UNHCR mounted a massive airlift, flying approximately 43,000 refugees back to Rwanda from Kisangani between April and June 1997. A total of more than 60,000 refugees were repatriated from Zaire by air. Another 130,000 repatriated by land during 1997 through Gisenyi, across the border from Goma, and Cyangugu, across the border from Bukavu. UNHCR estimated that by the end of 1997, there were still approximately 37,000 refugees in what was, by then, the Democratic Republic of Congo, including some militants, who continued to be an irritant to Rwanda.

Concurrent with this unfolding refugee crisis, the ADFL made significant gains, and in 1997 overthrew Mobutu. The new president, Laurent Kabila, who renamed the country the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and who had been supported by Rwanda, soon dropped his support for the Tutsi in eastern DRC, and did little to suppress the militants, and the militants continued their attacks in Rwanda, including targeting refugee camps. As a result of the widespread violence, displacement of Congolese increased. At the peak in mid-1997, there were an estimated 250,000-500,000 internally displaced Congolese. More than 70,000 Congolese had fled to Tanzania, with thousands also going to other neighboring countries. As the fighting abated somewhat in the second half of the year, many of the displaced returned to their homes. At the same time, several thousand refugees from northwest Rwanda fled to the DRC as a result of increased armed conflict, and about 50,000 refugees from the Republic of Congo took refuge in the DRC as a result of violence. Most of the 160,000 Burundian refugees in the country left the DRC as a result of the fighting, with about 40,000 left by the end of the year. Thousands of Sudanese refugees also left the DRC because of the fighting, as well as somewhat more hospitable conditions in their home country.

In the first part of 1998, most of the conflict was confined to the Kivu region in eastern DRC, and approximately 50,000 refugees returned to the DRC, primarily from Uganda and Tanzania. However, in August, more than four years after the genocide and initial flows of refugees into the country, widespread civil war broke out again in eastern DRC, with Rwanda and Uganda supporting various groups against the Kabila government, which it had once supported. Eventually, most of the countries in the region intervened, including Burundi, Tanzania, Angola, Sudan, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Zambia. Motives for intervention included supporting the rebels and ousting the militants, supporting Kabila, and gaining access to diamond deposits and other resources. Thus, the presence of so-called "refugee warriors" in the DRC provided the pretext for some countries to intervene, and the apparent necessity of action by others to ensure their security.

As a result of the renewed fighting, hundreds of thousands of Congolese were displaced, some for a few days, some for many months. By the end of the year, 300,000 were internally displaced, and 130,000 Congolese were refugees in other countries. Further, some estimates put the number of displaced at as much 80% (up to 1 million) for short periods of time in eastern parts of the country. In 1998, tens of thousands of new refugees from Angola arrived on the DRC as a result of the increased fighting, as well as several thousand more Burundian refugees. Meanwhile, most of the refugees from the Republic of Congo and about half of the refugees from the Sudan repatriated, although 20,000 new refugees from the Republic of Congo returned later in the year as a result of new fighting. The repatriation to the Sudan was apparently under less than voluntary conditions, as Sudanese rebels forced the refugees back.

1999 brought a dramatic expansion in the fighting and displacement. The main rebel group, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), split into to two factions, supported by Rwanda and Uganda, respectively. Soldiers from these two countries-former allies-also fought each other directly. There were increasing fears that Rwanda intended to annex the eastern part of the country. In July and August, the main combatants signed the Lusaka Accords, which were intended to end the fighting, and the UN authorized a small observer force to monitor the peace. However, there was no peace to monitor as fighting raged. By the end of the year, about 20 different armed groups had taken part in the fighting, as the push for control over valuable natural resources intensified. Reports of massacres, rape, and looting were widely reported. By the end of the year, approximately 240,000 Congolese had become refugees, and 800,000 were internally displaced, close to half of these in eastern Congo. Much of this movement was not as the result of generalized violence, but because of direct victimization of one group by one or more of the combatant forces. In addition to the displaced, the UN estimated that as many as 14 million Congolese were in need of humanitarian assistance, with widespread reports of famine, malnutrition, and epidemics.

Heading into 2000, the various rebel factions controlled about 60% of the country, and fighting continued in many parts of the DRC. The Lusaka Accords bore very little fruit in constraining the violence as widespread human rights violations and targeting of civilians continued. During the year, another 130,000 Congolese fled the country, and another 1 million became internally displaced, bringing to a total of approximately 350,000 refugees and 1.8 million IDPs. Close to half of the IDPs were in eastern DRC, in North and South Kivu, Orientale, and Maniema Provinces, which were occupied by RCD and Rwandan troops who were generally opposed by the local populations. Most of the displaced were in very isolated areas, far from the view of the international community and the reach of humanitarian organizations. Further, UN relief agencies received less than one-third of the funds they has asked for. According to one estimate, by mid-2000, about two years after the war began, 200,000 civilians had died as a direct result of the war, and 1.5 million had succumbed to war-related malnutrition, disease, and displacement. Further, 20 million people, 40 percent of the population were directly affected by the war, including 16 million who faced shortages of food because of the inability of farmers to harvest their crops or get their crops to market. Agricultural activity was devastated across the country. At the end of the year, there were approximately 275,000 refugees from other countries living in the DRC. The fighting made their situation increasingly tenuous as it became harder for them to find protection. Both the government and rebel groups hampered the ability of humanitarian organizations to gain access to affected populations as civilians continued to be pawns in the conflict. Armed Sudanese rebels became the de facto authority in one refugee camp.

The main development in the DRC in 2001 was the assassination of Laurent Kabila. His son, Joseph, ascended to power, bringing at least a little progress in efforts to end the fighting. However, even with a more extensive cease-fire, fighting persisted, particularly in eastern Congo, as did a variety of human rights violations and the looting of natural resources. Another approximately 200,000 became internally displaced, bringing the total IDP population to 2 million, while an additional 30,000 Congolese became refugees outside the country. Close to 90% of the displaced were in eastern Congo, and about 75 percent of the displaced were in areas controlled by rebels or Rwandan and Ugandan troops. Half of the IDPs received no international assistance, and fleeing did not necessarily bring safety. By the end of the year, up to an estimated 2.5 million Congolese had died as a result of the war. An additional 50,000 refugees from other countries arrived in the DRC during the year.

2002 brought continued devastation to the DRC. An additional 200,000 - 400,000 people fled their homes during the year as a result of the war. By the end of the year, up to 2.5 million Congolese were internally displaced, and another 40,000 Congolese newly fled the country. Up to another 500,000 people died during the year, bringing the total death toll of the war to 3 million. More cease-fire and power-sharing agreements were signed, and many of the outside parties to the conflict withdrew some soldiers. However outside soldiers remained, particularly from Rwanda. The withdrawal of these forces, while sometimes allowing displaced persons to return, also created power vacuums that prompted even more intense fighting among local militias to gain control of territory. In September and October, thousands of Congolese refugees were forcibly repatriated by Rwandan troops and militia from the branch of the RCD associated with Rwanda. Humanitarian organizations continued to be unable to reach a large portion of the displaced, and they received less than half of the funds they had requested for operations during the year.

Fighting continued in 2003, but the year also brought some new signs of hope and a larger intervention on the part of the international community. In June a power-sharing agreement was signed by the government and rebel factions and the new government was sworn in in July. While most foreign troops had left the country, and tensions had decreased, fighting continued in some areas. The withdrawal of Ugandan troops from Ituri province in northeastern DRC destabilized the province even further, leading to expanded massacres of Hema and Lendu in Bunia. This finally spurred the international community into action, and the UN Security Council authorized a European-led force to stabilize Bunia, later creating the UN Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC) to take over in September. As of early 2003, there were an estimated 2.7 million IDPs, 390,000 Congolese refugees, and 330,000 refugees from other countries living in the DRC. By the time the transitional government was sworn in, up to 3.5 million Congolese had lost their lives as a result of the war.

Refugee Hosting/Producing Countries: Zaire/DRC