The beginning of the end for FARC came with a whimper, not a bang. The Armed Revolutionary Forces of Colombia - otherwise known as Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - lost the biggest battle they never fought. Getting hit operationally and politically with a haymaker, FARC is finished. It’s not a matter of ‘if’ now - but ‘when’ the 10-count is reached.

Having spent some time in-country back in 2001 and 2002 on Plan Colombia, it was just in the early stages of operation. I supported the DNE, also known as the Dirección Nacional de Estupefacientes (translated version HERE), as they built out their capability to seize and manage assets from the narco-traffickers, or, more appropriately, narco-terrorists.. To understand how far Colombia has come, let’s understand what conditions on the ground were 8 years ago (this is a lesson about having patience with a strategy).

To put this into perspective, the narcotrafficantes wasted more money than the government had to update their systems. They (government) were outspent, outmanned and outgunned. The DNE had a serious concern about corruption and threats. There were generally two ways for the narcotrafficantes to get information - they paid or they threatened. With bribes, it didn’t take much to match the yearly pay of any government employee. And if you weren’t the money type, they simply threatened to kill your entire family - and did. With outdated systems and paper-based intensive processes, it was extremely difficult to track and manage seized assets.

The good part was that the government had seized hundreds of millions in assets. That  bad part was that the majority of it was in FARC-controlled territories, and no one had actually seen the majority of assets in 2-3 years. The only way to ensure they were still there to be managed was to go into enemy territory and check. Some assets were too big to be moved initially (boats, planes, vehicles), and other assets included ranches (or fincas), business and even shopping malls.

The plan called for the Colombian army to escort teams of people into the countryside to confirm the existence of the asset and the present condition. This is during a time when FARC was in control of a significant amount of territory and operations. There are many who questioned Plan Colombia’s modus operandi, especially spraying defoliation agents (reminiscent of Agent Orange). And, at first, it was an operation in search of a plan. The escalation of tactics, like the human proxy bomb (a tactic learned from the IRA), left the government looking inept and lacking the backbone to take a stand against the FARC.

But then things began changing. Two events that steeled President Uribe was not just when FARC attacked one of his campaign appearances (April 14, 2002 in Barranquilla), but when they attacked on inauguration day (August 7, 2002). In 2003, Uribe began hitting back. By the end of that year, Bogota had been cleared by the military of FARC influence. President Uribe had several things going for him, including a couple that were made out of brass. This was part of Plan Patriota - a military complement to Plan Colombia - and it was begging to have measurable results.

There were political setbacks for Uribe. His socioeconomic agenda - a 15 point plan - failed at the polls except for one point on public corruption. There were many opportunities to quit and give up, and not make the tough decisions. Fast forward to July 2, 2008. This perhaps was the toughest decision ever made by Uribe. If it worked, this would do more than release 15 high-profile hostages. It would be the tipping point needed to reduce FARC to a minor nuisance. If it failed, the consequences would most likely lead to increased violence and the death of some of the hostages. And it would certainly lead to a major political setback.

Operation Checkmate was conceived and executed by the Colombian Military with the aid of US technology. It was made possible by one of the oldest motivations - revenge. One of the FARC commanders had his ranch taken by his leadership. Communications had been reduced to couriers because of the disruption inflicted by military operations. Multiple types of intelligence, including good old fashioned HUMINT. Soldiers trained for 3 weeks with a college professor who taught theater to learn how to act like guerillas. A couple even wore Che Guevera t-shirts. Nice touch.

Terrorism, whether fueled by drugs or politics, is still terrorism. Although the Colombian government paid lots of money for information, neither they or the US government paid FARC to release the hostages. FARC had the chance many times to come to terms with Uribe and live peacefully. Now it will not be on their terms. It will be terms set by Uribe and Colombia. And none of these terms call for the continued existence of FARC.